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Abstract
The Faroe Islands are currently struggling to find their feet in a new context of
globalisation and changing international requirements on fishery management best
practices, as exemplified by United Nations protocols and agreements. We introduce
the Faroese fisheries effort management system for cod, haddock and saithe, which
represents an innovative attempt to tackle the challenges of mixed fisheries by
means of a combination of total allowable effort implemented through days-at-sea
and extensive use of closed or limited access areas. Subsequently, we present and
discuss controversies concerning the system’s ability (or lack thereof) to achieve a
level of fishing effort that produces long-term sustainability. Over the years the
system has proved able to evolve and overcome challenges, and the Faroe Islands
are currently considering adding a proper fisheries management plan to the system
to achieve fishing at maximum sustainable yield. However, finding support for this
plan presents a challenge due particularly to an enduring gap between the perspectives
of scientists and actors in the catching sector. Finally, we outline some actions
that could be taken to reduce the gap and hence facilitate reform of the system:
1) integration of the consultative/advisory process; 2) obtaining tailor-made advice for
the Faroese effort management system from the relevant scientific body; 3) establishment
of a transparent mechanism for monitoring and regulating fishing effort; 4) clarifying
the efficacy of the prevalent system of closed areas.
Keywords: Faroe Islands; Mixed fisheries; Effort management; Closed areas;
Governance; Fishing sustainability; Management plans; Discard mitigation; Sociology of
science
Introduction
Fishing and fish processing have been the main sources of income for the Faroe
Islands since the 1920s. The fisheries industry — including the catching and process-
ing sectors, and a comparatively smaller but growing aquaculture sector — contrib-
utes roughly 20 per cent of the gross domestic product (MFNR 2008). Additionally,
seafood related products represented over 94 per cent of the Faroese merchandise ex-
ports in 2012 (MFNR 2013a). Close to being a ‘mono-product’ economy, the Faroese
national economy to a large extent stands and falls with the fisheries industrya and is
highly vulnerable to the volatility of catches and prices of the most important fish
stocks (Búskaparráðið 2010).
© 2014 Hegland and Hopkins; licensee Springer This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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Populated by only about 48,000 people, the Faroe Islands are a self-governing terri-
tory within the Realm of Denmark with its own Faroese Home Government (FHG)
and parliament (Løgtingið). Under the framework of the Home Rule Act of the Faroe
Islands, powers are divided between the Faroe Islands and Denmark. The Faroe Islands
decided not to join the European Union (EU) when Denmark did so in 1973. Thus, as
fisheries management within the Faroese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the
Home Rule Act remains the responsibility of the FHG, the Faroe Islands are not sub-
ject to the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) (Statsministeriet 1948; MFNR 2008;
SFI 2012).
Traditionally, the most important fishery conducted in Faroese waters is the mixed
demersal fishery targeting cod (Gadus morhua), haddock (Melanogrammus aeglifinus)
and saithe (Pollachius virens) primarily on the Faroe Plateau and Faroe Bank. Between
1996 and about 2002, the mixed demersal fishery thrived and the Faroese gained a
reputation for being near the forefront of fisheries management and sustainable fishing,
due to a large extent to the performance of a new fisheries management system estab-
lished in 1996 (Chuenpagdee and Alder 2001). Contrasting to the approach in most
other European countries, the system implemented aims at controlling fishing effort
(i.e. input control) rather than directly controlling the amounts of fish caught or landed
(i.e. output control). Major advantages of the Faroe Islands’ effort-based system in-
cluded resolving (by a landing requirement for all fish caught) the previously prevalent
at-sea discarding of the unwanted bycatch of fish which was disliked by the fisheries in-
dustry, the relative simplicity of management administration of the new effort system
compared with the previous output-based system and the major role of the catching
sector in co-developing the new system (Jákupsstovu et al. 2007). However, in the last
decade, various concerns have emerged concerning weaknesses in the Faroese system,
including scientific advice not taken into account properly when deciding on the effort
and fishing mortality applied to the target stocks; failure to set up a system for effect-
ively monitoring fishing effort; lack of implemented fishery management plans (FMPs)/
harvest control rules (HCRs); overcapacity, poor economic performance and profitabil-
ity (Jákupsstovu et al. 2007; Christensen et al. 2009; Baudron et al. 2010; Búskaparráðið
2010; ICES ACOM 2012a; Nielsen et al. 2012). The system is currently under heavy
pressure, both nationally and internationally, to reform.
Under the EU’s CFP, fish stocks are managed primarily by annual catch limits, i.e.
output as total allowable catch (TAC) together with technical measures (Holden
1994). EU fisheries management, however, has been particularly impaired when using
single-species TACs in mixed fisheries situations due to associated discarding at sea
(Holden 1994; Daan 1997). Thus, TACs restrict the official landings but not the catch,
such that the discrepancy between the two output measures may be substantial and
difficult to determine accurately. In January 2014, the reformed CFP came into force,
including a ban on discarding of fish together with a requirement for full catch ac-
countability, as well as a legally binding commitment to fish sustainably according to
the principle of maximum sustainable yield (MSY, i.e. the largest yield/catch that can
be taken from a species’ stock over an indefinite period) in the context of multiannual
FMPs (EU 2013).
Having given a short introduction to the Faroe Islands’ context, we present the Faroese
effort management system. We then discuss the system’s ability (or lack thereof) to
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sustain a level of fishing effort that produces long-term resource sustainability and the as-
sociated controversies and uncertainties around this. Finally, we explore how the Faroe
Islands are attempting to move towards a fisheries management system along the lines of
current international standards and provide some ideas on how the Faroe Islands can
move forward.
The current paper is primarily concerned with describing and diagnosing the Faroese
fisheries management system with the aim of being able to offer advice on how the sys-
tem could be reformed. However, the article could also be read in the context of some
more generic debates in fisheries science.
One such debate relates to the role of science in fisheries management and how science
is fed into decision-making. In a relatively recent paper by several of the important
scholars in the field in Europe, calls are made “for a more interactive system of producing
a common knowledge base”, thereby changing the role of scientists from traditional ‘ex-
perts’ to ‘transparency experts’ assisting “stakeholders in trying to build an accurate com-
mon picture of the marine environment” (Schwach et al. 2007: 803). The Faroese system
offers a case of a system that adheres to a traditional approach that separates science and
stakeholders (with the implications hereof) and is therefore a useful reference.
In addition to the above, the Faroese case is also an example of an effort-based sys-
tem. Effort-based systems are interesting not only because they are rarer than their
TAC/quota-based counterparts but also because they are considered less bureaucratic-
ally cumbersome, which is of increasing interest as the economic importance of capture
fisheries sector decreases. Furthermore, effort-based systems present an attractive fix to
the notorious discards-problem, which has for instance been a major issue under the
CFP. Currently, the EU is implementing a discard-ban in the TAC/quota-approach and
there are few discussions on moving towards effort based management. However, in
connection with the 2002/03 reform of the CFP effort management was considered as
a serious alternative to the current TAC/quota-approach (e.g. Shepherd 2003). Similarly,
only a few years ago the North Sea Regional Advisory Council was actively promoting an
experiment with effort-management in the Kattegat. This was welcomed by the European
Commission but never materialised (Fisheries Secretariat 2014). In exploring effort-
management and the features that can possibly inspire TAC/quota-based approaches, the
Faroe Islands remains the only ‘local’ inspiration for EU decision-makers.
Materials and methods
Publications on the Faroese effort management system were collected as part of a com-
prehensive literature review. A systematic approach was applied to conduct an electronic
search of catalogues, bibliographies, and discriminating use of internet search engines.
Relevant material sources (articles in peer-reviewed scientific journals or books, as well as
grey literature) were read and new references identified through the citations.
Having familiarised ourselves with Faroese fisheries management in general, and the
effort management system in particular, we conducted a series of semi-structured inter-
views (average about 1½ hours) predominantly with fisheries industry representatives
(catching, processing, and fishery unions), fisheries managers and ecologists/biologists
and social scientists associated with the mixed demersal fishery. Regarding the fisheries
industry, we predominantly interviewed representatives from the catching sector, which
is the sector most concerned with and vocal about fisheries management. It was not
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possible to identify any relevant representatives of environmental non-governmental or-
ganisations (ENGOs). A total of 17 individualsb were interviewed (in 11 interviews)
during a field trip to the Faroe Islands in August 2012. The interviews followed a list of
standardised questions/topics, prepared in advance, and took into account our litera-
ture review and our wish to learn more about the effort management system and its
challenges.
The interviews, which were recorded and subsequently transcribedc and organised by
means of textual analysis software, served a dual purpose. On one hand the interviews
filled in gaps in the factual knowledge on the Faroese effort management system ob-
tained through the literature review. Equally important, however, the interviews uncov-
ered controversies and different perceptions on issues related to the Faroese system.
The respondents were granted anonymity and will only be identified by their affiliation
with one of the stakeholder categories.
For comparisons of the levels of fishing mortality (F) exerted on stocks of cod, haddock
and saithe between 1987 and 2011, we used the Multiple Sample Comparison (MSC) pro-
cedure in the Statgraphics Centurion XVI Professional package (StatPoint Inc.). Tests
were run to determine whether or not there are significant differences between the means,
variances, and/or medians of the F values pertaining to these three stocks. In the MSC
procedure, an analysis of means (ANOM) plot (Ott et al. 2005) displayed the sample
means for each of the three stocks on a chart in order to easily determine which means
are significantly different from the ‘grand’ mean for all stocks.
Background
While most governments around the North Atlantic adopted fisheries management
based on TACs following the establishment of extended national fisheries jurisdic-
tions in the mid-1970s, the Faroe Islands continued to manage the demersal fishery
in their EEZ by means of traditional technical regulations, including application of
minimum mesh sizes and closed areas. Thus, the Faroese regulations had the ob-
jective of controlling the catch composition, for instance by reducing the catch of
juvenile fish, rather than constraining the volume of the catch (Gezelius 2008a). It
is not clear why the Faroese continued to apply the somewhat traditional approach
while most other states moved ‘forward’. It is likely that a number of factors con-
tributed to this.
A licensing system for the demersal fishery was first implemented in 1987, thereby
providing a means to regulate catch levels (Gezelius 2008a). Thereafter, but before
1994, the demersal fishery in the Faroese EEZ was managed by a combination of license
limits (curbing the number of fishing vessels), area restrictions for trawl fisheries
(e.g. closed areas and seasons), minimum mesh sizes, and measures to protect juvenile
fish (Maguire 2001; Jákupsstovu et al. 2007). To reduce F and recover declining stocks in
the wake of a near collapse of the Faroese economy in 1992, a new TAC-based manage-
ment system, implemented by means of individual transferrable quotas (ITQs), coupled
with a discard ban, was introduced in 1994 when the Faroe Islands constructed its first,
comprehensive legal framework for fisheries management, the Commercial Fisheries Act
of 1994 (Løgtingið 1994). However, the ITQ system was abandoned after only two years,
not only due to the substantial costs and administrative effort necessary for this manage-
ment form, but also because it received considerable criticism and resistance from the
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catching sector (Gaard et al. 2002). It has also been argued that the TAC-system was
in part forced upon the Faroe Islands by the Danish government (at least so it was per-
ceived) as part of a package in which the Danish government helped solve the Faroese
financial problems in 1992/93 (Gezelius 2008b). This did not contribute to the per-
ceived legitimacy of the new system.
It is widely recognised that management by TACs of species caught in mixed fisheries
— as the Faroese mixed demersal fishery — is problematic because the quota of differ-
ent species may be exhausted at different rates. Thus, fishers face a dilemma when the
quota for one species is exhausted: stop fishing and underutilise the quota for other
species, or continue fishing and discard or illegally land over-quota fish (Daan 1997).
With the latter option, the F level dictated by the TAC will be exceeded, and the scien-
tific basis for stock assessment and future management advice will be compromised if
the stock assessment is based only on official landings data, assuming that landings
equal the catches (Kraak et al. 2008).
In the Faroe Islands, the TAC-based system resulted in extensive discarding as well as
under- and misreporting of substantial parts of the catch, related to bycatch problems
that were increasingly difficult for fishers to handle, particularly when single species
quotas had been used up (Maguire 2001; Jákupsstovu et al. 2007; Gezelius 2008a;
Johnsen and Eliasen 2011). The situation was exacerbated also by unusually low
primary production on the Faroe Plateau ecosystem during the early 1990s, which
subsequently had a devastating effect on the Faroese demersal fishery and society in the
mid-1990s (Gaard et al. 2002).
In response to the wide-reaching criticism of the TAC-based system, a general desire
emerged to establish a new system that was easy to administer and enforce, and should
remove incentives for discarding incidental catches, misreporting and black landings
(Gezelius 2008a). The chosen solution was a distinct Faroese management system fo-
cusing on the regulation of fishing effort rather than catches.
Elements of the Faroese effort management system
The Faroese effort management system was implemented in 1996 after a short, joint
design-effort between managers, scientists and key fisheries sector representatives
(Jákupsstovu et al. 2007). This system has evolved somewhat over the years, but the
main elements are still basically the same today.
A fundamental objective of the Faroese effort management system is to regulate fishing
effort so that the annual catch of the three most important demersal stocks (cod, haddock
and saithe) does not exceed 33 per cent of the stocks, corresponding to controlling F
at ≤ 0.45 on each of the three component stocks (Jákupsstovu et al. 2007).
Beneath, based on available literature (Løkkegaard et al. 2007; Jákupsstovu et al.
2007; Gezelius 2008a; Gezelius 2008b; Christensen et al. 2009; Zableckis et al.
2009; Johnsen and Eliasen 2011; Løgtingið 1994; ICES NWWG 2012; DNV 2013),
as well as our fact-finding fieldtrip to the Faroe Islands, the most important ele-
ments of the Faroese effort management system are described.
Fleet segmentation
Fleet segmentation is a central element in controlling and dispersing fishing effort and
the fishing pattern (e.g. where and when fishing takes place, and by which vessels), and
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in limiting conflicts between segments and active and passive gears. Different regulations
apply to different fleet groups (segments), but within a given group the same rules apply.
In addition, the objective of this intricate system of fleet segmentation and group-specific
regulations, set out in the Commercial Fisheries Act, is to ensure that different fleet seg-
ments — including trawlers, longliners, coastal vessels over 15 gross registered tonnes
(GRT), coastal vessels under 15 GRT, and others — as far as possible each catch a pre-
defined share of respectively cod, haddock, saithe and redfish (Sebastes marinus).d As a
general rule, holders of fishing days who fish outside a so-called ‘ring’ line, in waters dee-
per than 200 m, can fish for three days for each day allocated inside the ‘ring’. Illustrative
examples of specific regulations for various fleet groups include:
 One fishing day by longliners under 110 GRT is considered equivalent to two
fishing days for jiggers in the same gear category. Thus, longliners under 110 GRT
could double their fishing days’ entitlement by converting to jigging.e
 Trawlers are generally not allowed to fish within the 12 nautical miles (nm) limit.
In addition several other areas are closed to trawling either throughout the year or
parts of it.
 Single trawlers under 400 horse power (HP) are given special licenses to target
flatfish inside 12 nm with a bycatch allocation of 30 per cent cod and 10 per cent
haddock. In addition, they must use sorting devices in their trawls in order to
minimize bycatches.
Capacity regulation
Capacity regulation aims to maintain fleet capacity at the 1997 level within each fleet
group. It is taken for granted that the fleet capacity (fishing effort) is sustainable by not
resulting in overfishing of the targeted stocks in the long-term. There are rules for
allowing vessel transfers between groups (e.g. vessel replacement) and merging of cap-
acity. The capacity policy is based on vessel licenses: a ‘harvesting licence’ attached to a
specific vessel > 15 GRT, and a ‘fishing licence’ which allocates a certain number of fish-
ing days in the EEZ and tonnes of fish outside the EEZ. The transferability of fishing
days is restricted, and they cannot be transferred freely between gear and vessel
categories.
Effort regulation and tradability of effort
Maximum total effort expressed as fishing days (i.e. days-at-sea) is fixed annually for
the coming fishing year (running from 1 September in one year to 31 August the next
year) for each of the fleet groups and sub-groups. Excepting the artisanal fleet groups,
the total effort is then allocated equally between individual vessels in each of the fleet
groups. For the coastal fishery, 60 per cent of the total effort is allocated to full-time
fishers who receive individual, equal-sized effort quotas. However, artisanal part-time
fishers receive a common effort quota, i.e. not individually allocated, and their fishery is
closed when the quota has been used. Fishing days may be traded within fleet groups
and, with some restrictions, between groups. Fishing days can leased out for one year
or sold permanently. Official effort conversion keys are used when trading effort be-
tween fleet groups in order to account for differences in fishing capacity across vessel
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sizes, engine power and gear types. Individual vessels can meet restrictions from effort
limitation regulations by purchasing days-at-sea from other vessels. Thus, the effort
management system effectively allocates individual transferrable fishing effort rights.
The effort regulation is maintained through the fishing license system.
Area closures
An important characteristic of the Faroese regulatory regime is the comprehensive use
of areas closed in certain periods of the year, as well as areas closed for certain types of
fishing, in particular trawling. Such areas have been used since the establishment of the
200 nm Faroese EEZ in 1977. Initially the main purpose was to avoid gear conflicts be-
tween longline and trawl fishers, but it is now mainly used to regulate access rights to
fishing areas. Additional uses of area closures — for the protection of aggregating adult
fish on spawning grounds and juvenile fish in nursery and feeding grounds, limitation
of bycatch, or the protection of vulnerable species and habitats — have played an in-
creasing role in the case of temporary and seasonal closures. Up to about 1993, the ex-
tent and number of area closures in the EEZ gradually increased. Since about 1996 the
closed areas have remained basically unchanged, with the exception of three new areas
closed to trawling in 2005 to protect cold-water corals and additional area closures in
2011 within the 6 nm boundary.
Additional technical measures
Additional technical measures span regulations regarding mesh sizes, obligatory, per-
mitted or banned fishing gear, and bycatches. Specific minimum mesh size regulation
and use of sorting grids are applied to particular fisheries. Use of beam trawls and Danish
seine is banned. The general discard ban includes real-time rules for changing fishing
areas when bycatch occurs, with obligations for reporting when bycatch levels reach 30
per cent of the catch under a certain size limit, and a system of minimum landing sizes
for target species. In the context of discarding, all fish of commercial interest caught, in-
cluding bycatch, must be retained onboard, landed and registered.
Governancef and decision-making
Although the effort management system is a complex combination of rules and regula-
tions intended to achieve the target catch as well as accommodating the interests of dif-
ferent fleet segments, the central decision-making with regards to the Faroese effort
management system concerns the setting of the overall number of days-at-sea (an effort
quota comparable to the overall catch quota in an output management system). This
annual exercise starts when the Ministry of Fisheries and Natural Resources (MFNR)
receives the annual report from the Faroe Marine Research Institute (FAMRI). This re-
port is passed on to the Committee on Fishing Days (Fiskidaganevndin), appointed by
the Minister, consisting of representatives from the catching sector as well as a chair-
man who is not from the sector. This committee drafts its own report based on the
catching sector’s views and experiences. Building on FAMRI’s report and the committee’s
report, the Minister drafts a proposal for the coming year’s fishing effort concerning the
number of days-at-sea. The Minister’s proposal has tended to lie closer to the views of
the committee than to those of FAMRI. The Minister’s proposed bill is evaluated by the
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Fisheries Advisory Council (Fiskivinnurádid, a council under the MFNR, which includes
broader fisheries industry representation), concerning any potentially associated changes
that may be needed to fisheries policy and legislation. The Minister then presents the pro-
posed bill to the Parliament, which makes the final decision and amends the Commercial
Fisheries Act, see Figure 1.
With the exception of FAMRI scientists, prior to the proposal’s submission to Parlia-
ment all stakeholders taking part formally in the process are from the fisheries indus-
try. Thus, commercial fishing interests — especially from the catching sector ― have
substantial influence on the decision-making process. The fisheries industry is orga-
nised into special interest associations (e.g. Ship-owners Association, Fishermen’s
Union, Fish Processors Union, Association of Coastal Fishermen) and representation
remains within these groups. ENGOs are absent from the process and even from the
public debate, as indicated by our failure to find a representative to interview during
our fieldtrip. On the other hand, the diverse fleet structure of segments and métiers re-
sults in a large variety and complexity of frequently differing interests in the catching-
related representation. This complexity makes it difficult to gain agreement on effort
cuts across different fleet fractions.
As mentioned in several interviews, the process sketched above can be viewed as sub-
optimal as it provides little incentive or support for the integration of diverse views be-
tween scientists, managers and industry representatives. In particular, it ‘plays off ’ the
scientists against the industry and does not provide an effective forum for building under-
standing, trust and unification between these key actors. This leaves the politicians, in par-
ticular the Minister of Fisheries and Natural Resources, relatively free to determine the
final decision between the frequently conflicting positions of the scientists and fisheries
industry representatives. Whereas substantial progress has been made in the USA and in
the EU in detaching politics from the fishery decision-making arena, due to the emer-
gence of agreed rules-based FMPs (see later) and integrative stakeholder-based consulta-
tive forums (USA’s regional management councils; EU’s regional advisory councils)
(Hartley and Robertson 2006; Ounanian and Hegland 2012), Faroese decision-making
Figure 1 Flow chart for setting of the number of days-at-sea (Adapted from MFNR 2013b).
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remains entrenched in a politicised, adversarial system. Notably, the absence of ENGO ac-
tivity on the Faroe Islands may have contributed to the situation by pushing the scientists
(more than their colleagues in for instance mainland Europe) towards a role as ‘issue
advocates’ (i.e. protector of the fish) making them appear more as political actors than
as ‘honest brokers’ (Pielke 2007).
Evaluating the sustainability of the effort management system
In the current section we explore the extent to which the Faroese management system
can be considered biologically sustainable. Consequently, we are not looking into other
measures of sustainability, i.e. social or economic.
The Faroese effort management system enjoys considerable support from both the
fisheries industry, particularly the catching sector, and wide parts of the general public
(Jákupsstovu et al. 2007; Christensen et al. 2009). Criticism comes mainly from the sci-
entific community, which argues that the level of fishing effort has for a long time been
too high, thus exerting excessive F on the target stocks. The criticism is basically
divided into two arguments: 1) the implementation of the effort management system is
in breach of the relevant legislation, and 2) the legislation behind the effort manage-
ment system is out of step with major international agreements and standards of best
practice.
The core argument related to the implementation of the effort system is that it
produces F levels that are not in accord with the requirements. As mentioned, the
Commercial Fisheries Act has a major objective of regulating fishing effort so that the
annual catch of each of the three species does not exceed 33 per cent of the stocks in
numbers, corresponding to an average annual F = 0.45 (Jákupsstovu et al. 2007).
In Figure 2 the scientifically estimated F-levels for 1987 to 2011 for the three main
demersal species from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
are presented.
The F levels of all the stocks have varied substantially both before and after the
implementation of the effort management system in 1996 (Figure 2). Although allowing
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for occasional overshoots is implicit in the present system, the F-levels for cod, in
particular, have been high compared to the 0.45 target.
An analysis of means (AOM) plot (Figure 3) shows which means of the F values for
the individual stocks are significantly different than the ‘grand mean’ of the F values for
all the samples (i.e. all three stocks together). The grand mean for all three gadoids was
0.43 and cod (mean 0.54) and haddock (mean 0.30) had significantly different means
than the grand mean, whereas saithe (mean 0.44) was not significantly different. Given
that the Faroese effort management aims at an average (mean) F = 0.45, it is notable
that there is no statistical difference between 0.45 and the grand mean (0.43) of F for
the three gadoids in the period 1987 to 2011. This also applies for the period following
1996 when the effort management system was operational. Thus, the mean F for the
‘basket’ of gadoids (0.43) essentially has been in accord with the 0.45 aim of the effort
management system as the 0.45 value falls within the upper and lower 95 per cent
confidence limits of the plot. Of the ‘basket’ of gadoids, saithe falls within the 95
per cent confidence limits and haddock falls below the 95 per cent confidence limits
thereby fulfilling the desire of the effort management system that F ≤ 0.45. As cod
falls above the 95 per cent confidence limits, its F has significantly exceeded the
management aim.
The F levels in Figure 2 support Jákupsstovu et al.’s (2007) conclusion that the objective
of constraining the exploitation of the major demersal stocks by the effort management
system, so that F ≤ 0.45 on each of the three component gadoids, has not been achieved.
Thus, Faroese vessels have been fishing cod more intensively than the legislation
stipulates.
The question of whether the legislation behind the effort management system is
out of step with major international agreements and standards of best practice, the
second strain of criticism, relates to the absence of operational Faroese FMPs de-
signed to ensure that the catches (yields) from these stocks are sustainable. Influ-
ential international protocols and agreements setting such standards and relating to
the requirement for FMPs, aiming to produce maximum sustainable yield (MSY) from
Figure 3 Analysis of means plot for fishing mortality (F) levels of cod, saithe and haddock in
the Faroese mixed fishery from 1987 to 2011. The central line shows the grand mean (0.43) for all
three stocks, and upper and lower decision (95 per cent confidence) limits are shown at 0.47 and
0.38 respectively.
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fish stocks have emanated from the United Nations (UN) system. These instruments
are primarily:
 The 1995 Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries (FAO 1995), especially Article
7.3.3 “Long-term management objectives should be translated into management
actions, formulated as a fishery management plan or other management
framework”;
 The UN 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (UN 1995), especially Article 5(b)
emphasising that measures should be “…designed to maintain or restore stocks at
levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield, …”, and Article 6 specifying
that “a stock should be kept at a sustainable level by keeping it above a minimum
biomass benchmark and by keeping the fishing mortality below a maximum fishing
rate benchmark”; and
 The 2002 Johannesburg Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (FAO 2003), especially Article IV.31(a) of the Implementation Plan
calls for actions to “maintain or restore stocks to levels that can produce the
maximum sustainable yield….”.
The reiteration of the MSY approach from the Johannesburg Summit represented an
extension to, rather than an abrupt change in, most national fishery policies (Lassen
et al. 2014).
These instruments call inter alia for stock sustainability, in the form of a MSY-based
management and FMPs, consisting of stock and fishing intensity related reference
points (benchmarks) and HCRs. In this regard, effective fishery management requires
an understanding of how the fishery is performing relative to stock-related reference
points; the most commonly used reference points relate to the stock size (biomass, B)
and the levels of F that will result in changes in stock sizes, given various relationships
between the stock, recruitment, natural mortality, and growth (Beddington et al. 2007).
The FMP’s core contains the policy-related goal for fish stock management, expressed
in terms of fishing mortality/effort and targeted stock size. The FMP presents an indi-
cation of the preferred balance between stock-related conservation concerns and yield
(Lassen et al. 2014). Such FMPs encompass precautionary approach (PA) standards, re-
lated to the above UN policy instruments, in the form of ‘target’ and ‘limit’ reference
points ― which are designed to account for risk/uncertainty and for keeping fishing
within sustainable limits ― and recovery plans for stocks depleted beyond specified
levels. The Guidelines in Annex 2 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement outline
inter alia that: a) a limit reference point (LRP) indicates a state of a fish stock/
fishery that is considered undesirable, and a target reference point (TRP) indicates
a state that is considered desirable as a management objective; b) a fish stock/fishery
is anticipated to approach or fluctuate around a TRP, and should have a very low sta-
tistical probability of exceeding a LRP; c) TRPs are set to maximize yields (MSY) as a
management objective, and should not be exceeded ‘on average’; d) It is anticipated
that decision rules, such as HCRs, are established so that such reference points (i.e.
LRPs, TRPs) shall be used to trigger pre-agreed conservation and management action;
and e) recovery measures should be established for restoring stocks depleted beyond
specified levels.
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The fundamental reference points for fisheries referred to in the above-mentioned
international instruments are the biomass (BMSY) that can produce MSY resulting from
fishing at FMSY over a long time. It is clear that allowable catches can deviate from
MSY due to environmental and economic factors, interdependence of stocks, etc., but
catch rates above MSY (i.e. > FMSY) are likely to result in declines below BMSY and
lower catches in the long term (Froese et al. 2010). Thus, HCRs should adaptively and
periodically (i.e. autonomously) adjust fishing effort (E), and thereby F, to sustainable
levels reflecting the changing stock biomass. Having biologically-based MSY as a policy
objective has an intuitive appeal because MSY implies efficiency and maximized reve-
nues, and associated socio-economic benefits (Larkin et al. 2011). FMPs not only pro-
mote stock sustainability, but also form a key means for engaging diverse stakeholder
participation in the knowledge production and dialogue process, which underpins FMP
formulation (Hartley and Robertson 2006; Mackinson et al. 2011). In the USA, FMP
development involves a standard federally-mandated public participation process in-
volving scoping, public comment periods, hearings, etc. (Hartley and Robertson 2006).
In the USA and the EU, regional fishery management councils and regional advisory
councils, respectively, provide forums for stakeholder consultations and agreements on
FMPs (Hartley and Robertson 2006; Hegland and Wilson 2009). Furthermore, the
adoption of MSY-based FMPs, which are consistent with the PA, constrain the fishery
to pre-agreed parameters, which anticipate that catch limits do not exceed the level
specified in formal scientific advice. With catch limits ‘locked in’ empirically, there are
sparse prospects to embark on politically-driven ‘decision-overfishing’ (sensu Aps and
Lassen 2010) whereby fishing opportunities are set systematically higher than the scien-
tific advice based on sustainable exploitation. Because FMPs should be robust and fos-
ter stock stability and yield, they are also called multiannual or long-term management
plans (LTMPs).
ICES is the intergovernmental marine science organisation, which provides fishery
advice in the context of international agreements and addressing the policy and legal
needs of ICES 20 member countries and the regional fishery management organizations
(RFMOs), which they have established, around the North Atlantic and adjacent regional
seas (Rozwadowski 2002; Lassen et al. 2014). Due to the influence of the UN fishery in-
struments, in 2009 ICES developed the MSY and PA framework for giving its future ad-
vice connected with LTMPs and HCRs (Lassen et al. 2014). The LTMPs, and their
HCRs, result from political decisions at the national political and RFMO levels, and
ICES currently provides advice according to such plans where they are found to be
consistent with PA standards (Lassen et al. 2014). The advice has international legitim-
acy as it has been agreed in a committee of scientists which includes scientists
appointed by all governments of the ICES member countries. It is notable that whereas
Denmark, as an EU member state, has signed up to MSY-based management, the Faroe
Islands have not. This reflects the latter’s fishery autonomy from Denmark and it not
being within the EU. However, the Faroe Islands take part in ICES activities, including
the ICES advisory process, and may request scientific advice from ICES based on an
agreement between Denmark, the FHG and ICES (ICES 1989).
ICES has estimated FMSY for Faroese cod (ICES Subdivision Vb1, the Faroe Plateau),
haddock and saithe (in Division Vb comprising both the Faroe Plateau and the Faroe
Bank) at 0.32, 0.25, and 0.28, respectively (ICES ACOM 2012a). Thus, the F = 0.45
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target for these stocks, as set out in the Faroese Commercial Fisheries Act, is much too
high to fulfil the above-mentioned international standards. For many years, ICES has
advised a number of different actions with regards to these Faroese stocks, all with the
aim of substantially reducing the F-levels.
The concerns of ICES and FAMRI regarding the excessive F exerted by Faroese ves-
sels were relatively easy to ignore for the half dozen years of the effort management
system while trends for landings as well as the spawning stock biomass of the three
stocks were generally increasing. However, the trend has reversed over the last decade
(ICES ACOM 2012a). In particular the landings of haddock have plummeted,
together with its biomass level falling below the LRP and recruitment being close to
40-year minimums, such that ICES has recommended instigating a recovery plan in
2013 with F = 0.15. The cod’s current status is not good either. The biomass of cod on
the Faroe Bank is so low that fishing has essentially been stopped since 2009. The bio-
mass of the Faroe Plateau cod has been below or near the LRP since 2006 and recruit-
ment is close to a 40-year minimum, such that ICES has recommended instigating a
recovery plan in 2013 with F = 0.20. Currently saithe is the only stock whose biomass
is consistent with the PA as its spawning stock biomass is above the precautionary
reference point (Bpa), but ICES considers nonetheless that it is harvested unsustain-
ably (F > FMSY).
The controversies
The deteriorating situation of the Faroese demersal stocks has, over the last years,
fuelled a debate on the reasons for this and even more importantly what to do to rectify
it. At its core are various disagreements on the mechanisms of the effort management
system.
As noted earlier, the two opposing camps are – in the absence of ENGOs and in
the presence of a politicised, adversarial decision-making system - in the Faroese
context often the scientists and the catching sector. The role of scientists and the re-
lationship and interface between science and management in fisheries is a topic that
has attracted considerable scholarly attention lately, not least regarding studies of
ICES and the CFP (e.g. Schwach et al. 2007 and Wilson 2009). Consequently, in
addition to providing an insight into various controversies specific to the Faroe
Islands, the following is also a study of the relationship between scientific rationali-
ties and other rationalities.
The disagreement on the need for continuous adjustment of the number of fishing days
As described earlier, the number of fishing days for the coming fishing year is decided
annually at the political level, in principle based on input from the scientists and the
fisheries industry, mainly the catching sector in the latter case. Interestingly, the two
advisory parties strongly disagree on the basic point of this exercise.
The catching sector’s dominating perspective is that reductions in fishing days
should, as a matter of principle, not be used as a response to fluctuations in fish stocks.
Rather, cutting days should only happen in response to increased efficiency of the fleet
(i.e. effort ‘creep’). The sector’s argument is that the Faroese fleet has traditionally
always shifted its effort towards where the greatest fishing opportunities were. So if
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there were few cod, vessels targeted other, more abundant species, which is perfectly
possible because of the absence of output quotas.
The catching sector argues that the ‘automatic’ reallocation of effort towards the
most abundant species, together with the large areas that are either completely closed
for commercial fishing or closed for certain types of fishing, safeguards the stocks being
driven to depletion: “We believe that we in this system have regulated so that we will
never catch so large a share of the stocks that they will collapse” (Quote 1, fisheries
industry, translated).
Besides protecting particular areas and the fish within them, the catching sector
argues that the closed areas reduce the effective fishing pressure that can be exerted on
a fishing day (e.g. by preventing access to the best fishing spots) to an extent that has
to be accounted for in the scientific advice, something which the sector argues is not
the case:
The recommendation from FAMRI builds on intervening directly in the number
of fishing days, while what we are saying is that when you close a giant area
for longliners [in this case inside 3 nm] then this will—all things being equal—have
an effect on effort. Because you might very well still have a 100 days but you cannot
go to the best spots to fish. Clearly, this must have an effect. (Quote 2, fisheries
industry, translated)
Thus, the current low level of cod is, for significant parts of the fisheries industry,
explained not by reference to overfishing but by changes in the natural environment.
The catching sector finds support in the fact that massive cuts in fishing days have not
resulted in improvements for the cod stock.
Similarly, other fisheries industry respondents emphasise that there has been more or
less consistent overfishing of the saithe stock when measured against the current PA
and MSY reference points from ICES without this having led to a collapse of the stock;
rather the industry representatives emphasize that the stock continues to be resilient
and healthy.
The above, combined with a much referred to failure by Faroese biologists to predict
a swift recovery of the cod stock in the mid-1990s, has created a situation where the
catching sector generally considers that the system is already essentially sustainable. Or
at least that shifting to a system that is more directly based on stock assessments would
not be considerably more biologically sustainable.
As already mentioned, the catching sector does, however, generally accept that it is in
principle necessary to continuously cut capacity to make up for effort ‘creep’, tradition-
ally estimated to be about two to four per cent per year (Pauly and Palomares 2010).
Effort regulation incentivises fishers to increase their catchability because they are lim-
ited by the time they are allowed to fish (Nielsen et al. 2006). So called ‘technological
creep’ coupled with improvement of knowledge regarding best fishing practice to maxi-
mise potential catches over time, increases the fishing efficiency of fishing vessels, and
thereby increased fishing capacity regarding catch levels per fishing day (Jákupsstovu
et al. 2007; Nielsen et al. 2012). However, the catching sector argues from the assumption
Hegland and Hopkins Maritime Studies 2014, 13:12 Page 14 of 24
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/12
that the number of fishing days allocated from the outset of the system was appropriate
and sustainable:
We clearly accept that if there has been an increase in efficiency, there has to be a
reduction of days. That is what the system should be doing. From the perspective of the
biologists, you look at how the fish stock is doing; the traditional ICES approach. Then you
say: ‘Well, cod is not doing so well, therefore we have to cut fishing days.’ We are sort of
not on the same page. That is the problem. (Quote 3, fisheries industry, translated)
Jákupsstovu et al. (2007) emphasised that there was no evidence that fleets switch tar-
get species according to the relative abundance of all three species, which was one of
the underlying assumptions of the effort management system. ICES also questions the
mechanism of shifting effort, and has emphasised that for the Faroese effort system to
work properly in a mixed fisheries context, the relative effort directed towards each
species has to remain nearly constant, to ensure that the catches of each species are
adapted to the abundance of each stock (ICES ACOM 2008a, ICES ACOM 2008b).
ICES noted additionally that the recent decline in the cod stock was associated with a
marked increase in fishing mortality on cod, indicating that the management system
has not functioned properly in that respect.
The scientific community considers that the failure to set up a credible system for
monitoring changes in effective fishing effort is a major flaw (ICES ACOM 2012a).
Furthermore, there are big differences regarding the potential and actual efficiency
gains across the different catch segments. This makes cutting fishing days across the
board evermore illegitimate for certain parts of the fleet— in particular among traditional,
coastal vessels, which do not see themselves as able to increase effort:
The problem is that whenever you have to cut days, you have the lawnmower-model
and that is difficult to use. My personal opinion is that as long as you do not have
another model to take days away, then it will be complicated to cut them. (Quote 4,
fisheries administration, translated)
In contrast to the catching sector, the ICES-related scientific community believes that the
number of allocated fishing days (effort) must be linked to how stocks are fluctuating via
the proposed FMP, which reflects international best practice. The basis for the linkage is to
‘hard-wire’ into the FMP the empirical relationship between effort and F so as to ensure
that the effort level would be in accord with the principle of MSY (i.e. keeping the actual
F ≤ FMSY and B ≥ BMSY). This reflects the scientific conviction that fishing pressure is a con-
tributor to stock fluctuations, or at least that too high fishing pressure can have detrimental
effects at low stock levels. This is, as mentioned above, not readily accepted by the catching
sector, which highlights the closed areas in this regard and emphasises the uncertainty of
nature and the complex interactions that the demersal stocks are perceived to be part of.
The disagreement on the sustainability of the initial level of fishing days agreed
When the effort management system was originally set up, one of the key issues was to
decide on the initial number of fishing days. Since shortly after the start there has, how-
ever, been disagreement on whether the number first set was sustainable.
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From the scientific community’s perspective, one of the fundamental problems of the
effort management system is that the number of days originally allocated was too high
(Jákupsstovu et al. 2007; ICES NWWG 2012); too many days were distributed in order
to get everybody onboard. However, in the following years, when the number of days
should have been cut to better reflect the resource situation, there was no will for this.
This created a conflict between FAMRI, which considered that the industry was violating
a joint agreement, and the catching sector, which accused FAMRI for turning its back on
the system it had originally partly designed.
From the outset of the system—when it was set in place—there were far too many
days in the system. And that gave a tremendous throwback; because the unanimous
decision to take the system on led people to believe that the system was self-regulatory,
which of course it is not. So when [after the first year] we advised from the fisheries
research side to reduce the days, so the number of days at sea agreed with what the
law said, this was met with opposition and although the days have been reduced
gradually over the years, they have not been reduced to the extent to which we
thought was necessary. (Quote 5, fisheries scientist, translated)
According to one industry respondent, the FAMRI scientists found themselves
squeezed between loyalty to the agreement on the effort management system and loy-
alty to international colleagues in the ICES system. The latter were purportedly unable
to understand/accept the Faroese effort system, which fundamentally differs from the
TAC systems that ICES usually caters for. Based on our interviews with scientists, it ap-
pears that as ICES advice is basically geared towards TAC systems this has created a
complicated situation for FAMRI scientists. They have to balance between a) the ICES
system, which is not geared up to give targeted advice regarding the Faroese system,
and b) domestic expectations which lack guidance on how to do this due to a dearth of
clear domestic policy objectives and procedures.
The disagreement on how to interpret the presence of unused fishing days
Each year fishing days remain unutilised by Faroese vessels. When exploitation rates
are clearly under 100 per cent, which has been more common than not in several fleet
segments (Zableckis et al. 2009; ICES NWWG 2012), one can infer that insufficient fish
are available to sustain economically justifiable levels of catch per unit effort. So much
the scientists and the catching sector agree on.
However, the above disagreements on the need to link fishing days closer to the stock
status, as well as on the sustainability of the initial level of fishing days, spill over into
competing interpretations of what the presence of unused fishing days really means. To
the scientists, the presence of unused fishing days demonstrates that the initial effort allo-
cation was too high to constrain F, particularly for cod, and that too many available days
remain in the system. So, fishing days should be removed to bring the effort level down
to match the actual fishing opportunities. To the catching sector, the unused days are
contrarily seen as indicating that the system is working: “This is the core of the system.
If there are few fish, then we use few days; if there are many fish, we use many days”
(Quote 6, fisheries industry).
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The catch sector recognises that unutilized fishing days contribute to the system
possibly appearing unsustainable if considering single years, where fishing pressure on
one stock might surpass the F = 0.45 threshold, or any valid F level considered sustain-
able. However, in the long-term, the sector argues that the system is in equilibrium
where stocks are not in a risk of collapse, at least not due to fishing pressure. From the
sector’s perspective, the excess capacity, rather than being the problem, is the feature
that will allow the fleet to fish on the ‘tops’ whenever stocks are in good condition:
We are back to this issue of how you look at things. The biologists would say that
when stocks decline you should reduce capacity; however, the fishermen’s logic is: ‘we
need to have enough capacity to fish the stocks, when they are at their maximum, we
cannot decrease capacity just to suddenly need it two years later; that is no good’.
(Quote 7, outside observer, translated)
In addition, the catching sector has little hope that the number of days will be in-
creased again after having been cut. That situation, of course, might result in more
stable stock and catch levels, but stability does not seem to be a crucial objective of the
sector when it fears that stability will be at a considerably lower level than the present
average.
A self-regulating system?
The scientific community and the catching sector start from very different perspectives
concerning the above disagreements. In current MSY-related fisheries management,
self-regulation of fishing effort (E) occurs via the HCR which, as already noted, should
adaptively and periodically (i.e. autonomously) adjust E, and thereby F, to the level ne-
cessary to achieve MSY as guided by scientific assessments informing on the status of
the stock relative to established reference points. Thus, scientists see the Faroese effort
management system as being unbalanced from the outset (i.e. excessive E and F due to
too many fishing days) and furthermore unable to bring itself into balance due to the
absence of dynamic self-regulation, i.e. the lack of a FMP containing a dynamically re-
active HCR relating effort to stock fluctuations. However, the catching sector, views the
system as being in balance from the start and also as able to deal, in a semi-automatic
way, with imbalances that may arise. In our interviews, there were often references to
this disagreement regarding the extent to which the effort management system can be
considered partially or fully self-regulating. Meaning that it is an in-built feature that
the system’s design prevents an application of a level of fishing pressure, on a particular
stock, high enough to drive it to depletion or conversely that allows a stock at a low
biomass level, due to human or naturally induced impacts, to recover to desired levels
(not to be confused with the ongoing discussions of governance models resting on
self-management/self-regulation by the fisheries industry; for examples, see Townsend
et al. 2008).
Compared with traditional TAC management systems, the Faroese industry is proud
of operating what they perceive as a system in which there is little need to interfere as
most adaptations (except for effort ‘creep’) occur automatically. As one respondent ex-
plained: “Even though you could say that if all fishing days were utilized, then the fishing
pressure would be very high, it is not the case that all days are used. That is what you
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call a self-regulating system.” (Quote 8, fisheries administration, translated). Conse-
quently, the catching sector generally argues that the presence of closed areas, which
protect spawning areas and function as a stock refuge, in combination with economic
incentives to shift effort towards the most abundant species in a system that is inher-
ently in balance, ensures that stocks will not be driven to depletion.
To the scientists the notion of the self-regulating system has been used primarily as a
fig leaf by the catching sector to avoid having to cut days sufficiently (c.f. Quote 5). An
example of the weakness of the current notion of the fully self-regulating system is the
fact that it is not merely the state of the stock that determines whether it is economic-
ally viable to continue fishing:
This is where they say that it is self-regulating, because you would not go out unless it
is economically viable. But the problem is just that this is not just determined by the
stock; it is also dependent on oil prices and other things, so it is possible to fish the
stock down for the wrong reasons. (Quote 9, outside observers, translated)
Consequently, although there are self-regulating mechanisms in the system, it is not
clear how strong these are and this causes fundamental disagreement. Furthermore, the
differences in interpretation of the sustainability of the original level of fishing days are
important to have in mind when trying to understand the present situation. Finally, to
understand the differences in perspectives it is also necessary to recall that the standard
scientific models of ICES are generally not accepted across the board in the catching
sector. The latter is generally skeptical towards the scientific community and specific-
ally question whether the models are appropriate in the context of the Faroe Islands
and the unique effort management system.
A feature in the current setup of the effort management system, which seems to
have reinforced the differences described above, is that the final decision on fishing
days is taken at the political level, based on separate input from two sides: the biolo-
gists and the catching sector. As earlier noted, the decision-making system provides
little incentive for integration of views (c.f. Figure 1). Thus, the two parties position
themselves solidly in opposing camps. As one respondent put it: “It sort of becomes a
trade-off. If you give in too much you risk losing ground” (Quote 10, outside
observers, translated).
Adapting the Faroese effort management system to international best
practice
As highlighted earlier, the Faroese effort management system could benefit from align-
ing itself with the previously mentioned UN policy instruments including adopting
MSY-related management via LTMPs and HCRs in a PA approach (i.e. encompassing
limit and precautionary reference points for fishing levels and stock biomass). However,
the main issue regarding fisheries management in the Faroe Islands is not the effort
management system itself, but rather its inability to adjust to scientific recommenda-
tions (emanating from ICES as the custodian of best practice) and to variability and
trends in catchability (Baudron et al. 2010). This in turn is linked to the conviction that
the initial effort was set too high by the Faroese decision-makers, and that it was not
decreased sufficiently thereafter.
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It has been increasingly apparent in recent years that a major deficiency in the
Faroese effort management system is the lack of a proper FMP, and especially the
absence of related HCRs, for the demersal stocks (see also Anon. 2011a). In response
to this deficiency, as well as pressure to adopt MSY-related management by 2015 stem-
ming from broad-based international accord from the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration
(FAO 2003), in October 2011 a groupg appointed by the Faroese Minister of Fisheries
and Natural Resources formulated a draft FMP, based on general MSY principles devel-
oped by ICES, for cod, haddock and saithe including HCRs (Anon. 2011b; ICES
NWWG 2012). The outcome currently awaits discussion and necessary approval at the
political level (ICES ACOM 2012b).
The draft Faroese FMP (Anon. 2011b) includes a proposal for a stepwise reduction of
the fishing mortality of each of the three stocks to FMSY in 2015 and a recovery plan if
the SSB declines below a ‘triggering’ level. Key MSY and PA parameters for the three
stocks are mutually outlined by ICES (ICES ACOM 2012b) and by the draft Faroese
FMP (Anon. 2011b). These plans in draft emerged as three, independent single species
management plans, rather than a multispecies management plan. The multispecies
management plan approach is necessitated because in mixed fisheries the single species
objectives, concerning MSY and the PA, are difficult to meet simultaneously due to dif-
ferences in dynamics and initial state of the various stocks. The approach in a mixed
fishery is to manage on a ‘basket’ approach (e.g. the suite of targeted gadoids) where it
is acknowledged that not all target stocks will be able to achieve either their own or a
‘pooled’ MSY target at the same time. In reality, the mixed fishery will be managed such
that the various stocks which are in the ‘basket’ oscillate within a band as close as pos-
sible to the MSY target with respect to the exerted fishing effort, while ensuring that
the biomass of individual stocks do not fall below their particular precautionary or limit
reference points. Effort levels must be monitored credibly and periodically adjusted to
compensate for effort ‘creep’ and achieve necessary optimization. A properly function-
ing management system should contribute towards autonomous regulation, i.e. adjust-
ing effort and F to reflect changing stock status in MSY-related management, and
ensuring that the market for trading fishing days works properly. For the Faroese mixed
fishery, this would ideally entail hard-wiring the need for periodic increases or de-
creases in effort levels to the FMP, i.e. relating effort to fishing mortality and stock bio-
mass as ascertained by stock assessments. The rights-based, tradable nature of the
fishing days (i.e. an individual effort quota) provides for some autonomous adjustment,
but the Faroese Council of Economic Advisers considers that restrictions on tradability
limit its efficacy (Búskaparráðið 2010). The existence of excess effort/capacity in the
Faroese mixed fishery results in the economic revenue generated being lower than
when fishing sustainably (i.e. F ≤ FMSY, B ≥ BMSY). It is notable that the Australian
Northern Prawn Fishery, which is an effort-based mixed fishery for several prawn
species, systematically monitors and regulates the effort needed to achieve
maximum economic yield (i.e. net economic returns) by adjusting the gear units
(headrope length) (Kompas et al. 2010). Thus, effort in the Faroese context poten-
tially may reflect not only fishing days but technical measures connected to fishing
capacity such as hook numbers for long-liners and trawl openings – possibly modi-
fying the extent of closed areas could enter the equation as well, reflecting the
Faroese tradition for this.
Hegland and Hopkins Maritime Studies 2014, 13:12 Page 19 of 24
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/12
The fishing effort levels set for the ‘basket’ of stocks depends on how management
wants to optimise the relative catch of the particular stocks. Agreeing on this, in the
context of multispecies management plans, opens up for a complex debate not only on
stock conservation but also on matters related to societal choice in a wider socio-
economic context. Thus, there will be options and potential trade-offs in fishing oppor-
tunities as highlighted, for example, by recent ICES advice on mixed fisheries in the
North Sea ICES ACOM 2012c) underpinned by the Fleet Fishery Forecast framework
(Ulrich et al. 2011). Informed decision-making depends on detailed and disaggregated
knowledge of fleet/métier fishing behaviour in time and space, a feature currently mon-
itored well in real time by the Faroese authorities.
The Faroese FMP is currently in limbo in the political system and has not been
embraced in the recent annual revision of the regulations. This is despite mounting
pressure to reform the current system. It is likely that the Faroese reluctance to move
forward with the plan(s) is due to the controversies which we have described.
Conclusions and ways to move forward
The Faroese effort management system does not currently live up to international best
practice in fisheries management. In particular, the current system does not include a
FMP, with associated HCRs, promoting autonomous effort management and thereby
long-term stock sustainability in the form of MSY. Furthermore, the target F for cod,
haddock and saithe enshrined in the legislation significantly exceeds that necessary to
achieve MSY.
Whether or not the above is a contributory factor to the current overall state of the
Faroese demersal stocks is a matter of dispute between the industry and scientists. But
scientists argue that the associated overfishing constitutes part of the explanation.
Nonetheless, it is clear that — irrespective of its shortcomings — the system has several
very appealing elements. As examples, the effort management system has curtailed the
discards problem which blights many mixed fisheries. In addition, the system enjoys
considerable support from the industry, which is essential in any fisheries management
system. Further, the system exhibits great ingenuity in using targeted effort allocations
and extensive use of closed areas to both balance and steer catches, and cater for the
needs of diverse fleet segments.
Thus, the exercise that the Faroese face, insofar that they wish to move towards updating
their management system and reclaim their position at the forefront of fisheries manage-
ment, is to adopt reform without jeopardising the positive elements of the system.
A major problem regarding actually moving forward with a Faroese FMP in line with
current scientific knowledge is the enduring and substantive incongruity between the
perspectives of the catching sector and the scientific community. Based on our analysis,
we therefor suggest that a necessary first step should be to work on reconciling the two
camps. The following represent our suggestions on connected remedial actions which
could be taken.
Integration of the advice process
As described earlier, there is currently little formalised integration between scientist and
industry viewpoints. This reinforces the existence of divergent perspectives. Consequently,
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creating a more integrated (or ‘interactive’ (Schwach et al. 2007)) advisory process and
forums to consult and do business in could diminish this gap and thereby lead to in-
creased collaboration and trust between the primary actors. This may already be on
the way due to generational change and industry-scientist research cooperation. For
inspiration, examples of such integration in the EU include the presentation of ICES
advice by visiting scientists in the CFP’s stakeholder-led regional advisory councils,
and these councils acting as the primary stakeholder forum for promoting agreement
on FMPs, as well as the opening up of most ICES meetings to observers from for
instance the industry.
ICES to commence work specifically on the Faroese effort management system
The Faroese authorities should officially request that ICES starts working on producing
tailor-made advice for the Faroese management system. This would release the Faroese
scientists from being stuck between ‘a rock and a hard place’ as ‘translators’ of ICES
advice. This would in turn require full openness and transparency of all appropriate
data necessary for monitoring and analyzing fishing effort. The context of the effort
management system suggests that the Faroe Islands could become a valuable labora-
tory for advancing the management of mixed fisheries by using effort management
and closed areas. For the Faroe Islands this concerns few stocks and there is a high
degree of data availability on the stocks and the fleets.
Start to set up a system for monitoring capacity development
It is essential to develop a credible approach to measure and fully analyse fishing effort,
including ‘effort creep’, in order to measure how much fishing effort/mortality changes
over time in terms of fishing days. This should be possible due to the close monitoring
of Faroese vessels and their relatively modest numbers. Peer reviewed data and conclu-
sions on the status and trends of fishing effort deployment are essential, not least for
developing models to relate fishing effort to fishing mortality. The latter relationship
should eventually be ‘hard wired’ into the FMPs.
Improved understanding of the role and efficacy of closed areas
Faroese scientists, working via appropriate ICES expert groups, should – in cooperation
with the industry - intensify efforts to document and quantify the usefulness of various
closed areas for particular purposes. This lack of documentation concerns the catching
sector, which otherwise generally supports using closed areas in combination with ef-
fort management.
Although the above actions would not in themselves make a reform of the core
parts of the effort management system uncontroversial or easy, we believe that
this would facilitate making the difficult decisions that lie ahead, not least in rela-
tion to the inevitable reduction of fishing pressure on the stocks that is required
to achieve MSY-related best practices. The latter furthers both the long-term sus-
tainability of the stocks and the fisheries industry. Taking action on the above,
challenges scientists and the industry to collaborate in balancing conservation
concerns and yield.
Hegland and Hopkins Maritime Studies 2014, 13:12 Page 21 of 24
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/12
Endnotes
aIn the following, the fisheries industry will generally be defined as consisting of the
catching sector and the processing sector and not the aquaculture sector, although the
latter is often included especially for statistical purposes.
bMore specifically four scientists, seven industry representatives, three managers and
three ‘outside observers’; the latter including persons who had been vocal in the debate
on the effort management system but did not fit the other categories.
cMost of the Faroe Islands interviews were conducted in Danish/Norwegian/Swedish.
Whenever necessary (and indicated), the original quote has been translated to English by
the authors.
dAlthough managed through the effort management system, redfish are not usually
caught in a mixed fishery with the remaining species.
eThese conversion possibilities provide fishers with flexibility in selecting gear type to
use/how to deploy their effort.
fWe define fishery governance as the sum of the legal, social, economic and political
arrangements used to manage the fishery. The establishment of institutions, legislation/
policies, management plans and processes through which management may be realized
at appropriate levels (e.g. national and local) is fundamental to effective fishery govern-
ance. Governance also concerns how power, knowledge and decision-making are shared
amongst the key stakeholders.
gThe group consisted of scientists from FAMRI, and one representative each from
the MFNR, the University of the Faroe Islands, and the catching sector (trawlers).
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